This paper explores the optimal international tax policy of a small open economy with inbound and outbound flows of both portfolio and direct investment. Only three independent conditions determine the optimal rates of six taxes, implying that there are no unique values of optimal tax rates. For example, the optimal tax rates on domestic and inbound direct investment are related through a two sector general equilibrium model. In general, optimal tax rates on inbound investment are not zero, and those on domestic and outbound investment are not equal.
Introduction
The large increases in international flows of capital in recent years have been matched by a significant expansion in the literature on the optimal taxation of such flows. Two distinct approaches have been taken. One has aimed to assess the optimal policy of a single country. The other has aimed to assess policy which is optimal from the perspective of the world as a whole. 1 Within the first approach, the simplest case is that of a small open economy, which is either a capital importer or a capital exporter. Given competitive markets, this yields what Slemrod et al (1997) refer to as the "classical" prescriptions for taxing international capital flows. If a small capital-importing country imposes a tax on income from capital located in its jurisdiction, then the pre-tax required return on such capital will rise, so that non-resident investors earn the same return after tax. This tends to drive capital away, with a consequent reduction in welfare for domestic residents. In the absence of a binding revenue constraint applying to such a tax, the "classical" tax rule is then that such investment should not be taxed. 2 More generally, the government should take into account this additional cost in providing public goods, with the implication that public goods will be underprovided.
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For a small capital-exporting economy, the "classical" optimal tax rule is that income from such investment should be taxed at the same rate as income from domestic investment, with foreign taxes being treated as an expense of outbound investment.
For example, Feldstein and Hartman (1979) assume that both forms of investment are financed from a fixed stock of domestic saving; tax policy is therefore designed to generate the optimal allocation of saving between the two competing uses. Equality of tax rates ensures production efficiency: the marginal social rates of return are the same. Both of these tax rules are consistent with taxation by all countries on a residence basis only -which under these conditions are also optimal for the world as a whole (Razin and Sadka, 1991) .
These "classical" results have been challenged by several papers. Two are especially relevant to the contribution of this paper. First, Mintz and Tulkens (1996) make alternative assumptions which generate very different optimal tax rules. For example, they argue that tax rates on inbound investment should be set to maximise revenue.
This result stems from a crucial element of their model -that the entire output generated from inbound investment accrues to non-resident capital owners. Hence the only benefit of inbound investment is the tax revenue. By contrast, the "classical" model permits domestic residents to provide another factor in production (land or labour), and hence they receive part of the output. For capital exporters, Mintz and Tulkens argue that there is no link between the optimal tax rates on domestic and outbound investment. The difference in this case stems from their assumption of a perfect world capital market, from which domestic firms can raise unlimited finance. In this case, the required rates of return on domestic and outbound investment are determined by this world rate of return, rather than by the availability of domestic savings.
Second, Slemrod et al (1997) extend the "classical" model by developing a case in which a small economy can simultaneously import and export capital. In this case, the optimal set of tax rates is a "seesaw". Essentially the tax rate on domestic investment should equal to the sum of the tax rates on inbound investment and outbound investment: hence -given the tax rate on domestic investment -a rise in the taxation of inbound investment should be matched by a fall in the taxation of outbound investment, and vice versa. This is a generalisation of the "classical" results: if the tax rate on inbound investment is set to zero, then the domestic tax rate should be set equal to the tax rate on outbound investment. But the seesaw relationship can also hold with the tax rate on inbound investment positive. In this case, the pre-tax rate of return on domestically-located capital would be higher, inducing domestic investors to switch away from outbound investment to domestic investment. To offset this distortion, either the tax rate on domestic investment must rise, or the tax rate on outbound investment fall.
Another group of papers investigate the optimal tax policy of an individual country in the context of a game between two countries. For example, Bond and Samuelson (1989) and Janeba (1995) examine the optimal structure of taxing outbound investment -whether to exempt foreign income, or to give a credit or deduction for foreign taxes. Gordon (1992) follows a similar approach in a Stackelberg leader model, in which the capital exporter offers a credit for taxes paid abroad. This induces the capital-importer to set a tax rate equal to that of the exporter, which in turn permits the exporter to set a higher tax rate.
A further group of papers introduces the issue of the taxation of economic rent. 4 Most of the papers so far discussed are essentially applications of the Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency theorem, in which pure profits can be -and would optimally be -fully taxed. 5 At least two directions can be taken in relaxing such an approach: that for some unexplained reason pure profits cannot be fully taxed, and that the structure of imperfect competition and the gains to domestic investors may require that optimally such pure profits are not fully taxed.
This paper extends and generalises the results of the classical model, and in particular, those of Mintz and Tulkens (1996) and Slemrod et al (1997) . It leaves to one side issues involving games between two countries, and the presence of pure profit. It also focuses exclusively on the optimal tax policy of a small open economy, and does not address the optimal policy from a worldwide point of view.
Specifically, it considers two main extensions of the literature. First, it explicitly considers the different roles of international portfolio and direct investment flows. The underlying structure of the model in this paper is of a multinational company: investors around the world may purchase shares in the company as a portfolio investment, and the funds generated may be used to undertake direct investment in any country.
This is similar to the Mintz and Tulkens model, in that there is an international capital market, from which companies can raise finance. However, this paper explicitly models inbound and outbound portfolio investment, and inbound and outbound direct investment. It analyses taxes levied by a small open economy on each form of investment. It assumes a simple cost structure for portfolio investment similar to that used by Slemrod et al (1997) , which permits cross hauling of portfolio investment.
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It is assumed that direct investment is undertaken by companies and its subject to a corporate income tax, while portfolio investment is undertaken by individuals and is subject to a personal income tax. The model allows the corporate income tax rates on 4 See, for example, Janeba (1996 Janeba ( , 1998 , Haufler and Wooton (1999) and Devereux and Hubbard (2003) . Keen and Piekkola (1997) explore the implications for the tax rates which are optimal for the world as a whole, of not being able to tax rents at 100%. In this case, rents are the return to some fixed factor; imperfect competition is not explicitly modelled. 5 Keen and Wildasin (2003) discuss the issues which arise in extending the Diamond-Mirrlees result to open economies. 6 Individuals are not permitted to finance a domestic subsidiary of a non-resident company.
investment by resident and non-resident companies to differ, which could be achieved in practice through the use of withholding taxes. Similarly, the tax rates on income from portfolio investment are allowed to differ according to the identity of the investor.
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Second, this paper explicitly models the relationship between domestic investment by resident companies and inbound investment by non-resident companies. It avoids the two extremes of the literature, in which these two forms of investment are either simply aggregated to a single homogeneous capital stock (eg. Feldstein and Hartman 1979) , or treated as completely independent of each other (eg. Mintz and Tulkens, 1996) . In the former case, any rise in, say, the taxation of inbound investment raises the pre-tax rate of return to domestic investment resident owners of capital. This mirrors the approach of Devereux (2000) in analysing the optimal tax setting from a worldwide point of view. The main contribution of that paper is to explore in more detail the implications of "residence-based" taxation. With portfolio and direct investment, the relevant "residence" is that of the ultimate owner of the capital -not of the multinational company. In this setting, residence-based taxation is even harder to achieve than usually acknowledged. 8 This is similar to the approach of Hartman (1980) and Mintz and Tulkens (1996) It is also similar to a standard specific factors model from the trade literature, where some factor which is private to each country (for example, knowledge of a production technique, derived from R&D), and which differs between country; this approach was used explicitly by Batra and Ramachandran (1980) , for example. We also allow the production function to depend on where the investment is located. Beenstock (1977) also considers two-way flows by multinational companies; however, this model does not provide any rationale for such flows. 9 Of course, this model does not fully capture the behaviour of multinationals, which in practice is characterised by a number of factors, including possibly imperfect competition and the accumulation of private knowledge capital. For an introduction to the literature on multinationals, see Markusen (1995) .
The general aim of the paper is to consider links between the various investment flows -inbound and outbound, portfolio and direct, investment -and between the optimal tax rates levied on them. One way of introducing a link is to introduce a binding revenue constraint on the sum of the taxes analysed. The model abstracts from this by assuming that the government can levy a lump sum tax on residents to meet its revenue requirements, or pay a lump sum subsidy out of the proceeds of the taxes on capital. The government may nevertheless seek to tax non-residents; and doing so may imply offsetting taxes on residents.
The paper considers six taxes: on inbound, domestic and outbound investment, in each case either portfolio and direct. To anticipate the results, optimal taxes on portfolio investment follow the "seesaw" pattern of Slemrod et al (1997) . Optimal taxes on inbound and domestic investment are jointly determined. Given reasonable conditions, a higher tax on inbound investment requires a higher tax on outbound investment. And the optimal tax on outbound investment depends on whether the small country has any market power in the rest of the world. If it does, then the optimal tax rate may be positive; otherwise it should be zero. It is straightforward to show that both the "classical" results and the results of Mintz and Tulkens (1996) and Slemrod et al (1997) are special cases of this more general model.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 derives the first order conditions for each of the six tax rates. Section 4 considers the optimal combination of tax rates, given these conditions. Section 5 concludes. The general equilibrium model is set out in the Appendix. there may be local factors -such as proximity to other manufacturers or raw materials -which distinguish domestic and outbound production by resident companies.
The model

Notation
There are therefore two separate sectors within the home country. In this paper, each sector is assumed to produce one type of good. Mintz and Tulkens (1996) use a similar formulation. However, they implicitly make one crucial simplifying assumptionthat the two sectors are independent: changes in, say, K D have no impact on the return earned from K I . This strong assumption is not made in this paper.
Instead, the model permits several routes by which the two sectors are interdependent.
These are spelt out in a simple two-sector general equilibrium model in the Appendix.
The total stock of labour, L, is divided among the two sectors, so that L= L D + L I ; labour is freely mobile between the two sectors (although immobile between countries)
implying that the wage rate is the same in the two sectors. There are no international trade flows so that all goods produced are consumed domestically. Changes in the output of either sector are therefore likely to affect output prices in both sectors, depending on the degree of substitutability or complementarity between the two goods.
It is useful to define the post-corporation tax rate of return paid by each company to its shareholders, as R D (for resident companies) and R N (for non-resident companies).
Each company operates in conditions of perfect competition, and therefore takes the price of its output, p i , the wage rate in each location, w, and the required postcorporation tax rate of return on its investment, R j , j=D,N as given. It invests in each location up to the point at which its marginal pre-tax rate of return, denoted r i =p i i K Q , enables it to earn the required post-corporation tax rate of return.
There are six tax instruments. Tax rates on the returns to portfolio investment are denoted m i , i=D,F, I, and tax rates on the returns to direct investment are denoted t i , i=D,F,I where as above, D denotes domestic investment, F outbound investment and I inbound investment.
In principle, income received by residents from outbound investment may be taxed in the host country. Similarly, income paid to non-resident individuals or companies may be taxed in their country of residence. However, such taxes have no significant impact on the model developed in this paper, and they therefore not included in the formal analysis. The main notation is summarised in the box. Variables indexed by i take three values:
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Summary of Notation
i=D,F and I, corresponding to domestic investment, outbound investment and inbound investment.
No arbitrage conditions
There are four types of agent in the model: resident and non-resident individuals and resident and non-resident companies. Each agent has two investment opportunities and will only accept both if the post-tax rates of return are equal. Hence there are four no-arbitrage conditions, which -if all investment opportunities are accepted -define the required rates of return on each form of investment.
The small economy assumption implies that R N is unaffected by any activity or tax in the home economy, or by activities of resident companies abroad. That is, R N is a fixed, exogenous, international post-corporation tax rate of return. Since we do not explicitly model non-domestic taxes, this is equal to the net rate of return required by non-resident shareholders. Given this, other rates of return in the model are determined by the six tax rates, as shown below.
At the company level, there are two no-arbitrage conditions, (1) for resident companies and (2) for non-resident companies:
Before personal taxes, individuals receive the net of corporation tax returns, R D and R N ,. They too allocate their investments up to the point at which the post-tax rates of return are equal:
Non-resident individuals
As in Slemrod et al. (1997) , outbound portfolio investment is subject to a convex cost, c=c(W F ), (c'>0, c''>0) which may reflect transactions costs or imperfect information. In the absence of this cost, it could only be by chance that a combination of tax rates permitted residents and non-residents to invest in both resident and non-resident companies. With the additional cost, this is possible for any combination of tax rates
; that is, for any combination of tax rates for which crossborder flows are on average less heavily taxed than domestic flows.
Maximising Welfare
The government sets tax policy to maximise the utility of a representative resident individual. The individual consumes two goods -the output of the "domestic" sector, 
The first term in (5) is the total value of output generated from domestic investment by resident companies. The second term is the total return to outbound direct investment, given perfect competition and constant returns to scale. The second line represents the contribution to domestic national income of inbound investment: the total value of output, less the post-corporation tax return received by non-resident companies, at rate R N . 11 The net of tax return earned by resident companies that is paid to the nonresident investors is given by the first term of the third line. The second term of the third line represents the total return to outbound portfolio investment.
Optimal policy
We now derive the first order conditions for each of the six tax rates, taking all others as given. In the next section, we combine these conditions to find the overall optimal policy. In each case, the aim is to identify values of tax rates from which infinitesimal changes have no impact on U ie: dU = ( ¶U/ ¶p D ) dp D + ( ¶U/ ¶p I ) dp I + a dY =0, where a is the marginal utility of income.
The approach used is first to totally differentiate the four no-arbitrage conditions (1) to (4). Examination of these conditions indicates which capital flows and which rates of return are affected by a infinitesimal change in a particular tax rate. Combining these conditions with the general equilibrium model in the Appendix yields values of dp D and dp I . Finally, totally differentiating (5) yields an expression for dY. Combining these elements yields a first order condition for each tax rate.
Before proceeding, it is useful to emphasise the following:
Proof: This is immediate from (4) Q , differentiating the first part of (1) implies: dp D + Q I dp I
That is, the change in total income consists of four components: the change in the tax revenue from inward portfolio investment (which depends on change in K D ); the change in the tax revenue on inbound direct investment (which depends on the change in K I ); and impact of consequent changes in output prices in the two sectors of the economy.
To find the optimal value of t D , conditional on all other taxes, substitute (7) 
dU/a = [1 -(1-m I )(1-t D )]r D dK D + t I r I dK I (8)
That is, the change in indirect utility depends solely on the first two of the above effects: the change in the tax revenue from inward portfolio investment and inward direct investment.
This expression resembles standard expressions in the literature. To see this, assume for the moment that there is no change in direct inward investment, dK I =0. Denote,
T=[1 -(1-m I )(1-t D )
] to be the overall tax rate charged on domestic investment by resident companies financed by inbound portfolio investment. Then (8) reduces to dU = Tr D dK D . Given that dK D /dT<0, then in the absence of a revenue constraint, the optimal tax rate on such investment is at the minimum bound of T=0.
However, (8) differs from standard expressions in two ways. The first is the more explicit treatment of taxes on inbound portfolio investment and domestic direct investment (ie. considering m I and t D instead of simply T). The second, and more significant, is that the impact on inbound direct investment is explicit. Because dK I may not be zero, the range of possible optimal tax rates is much wider.
To investigate this further, the Appendix develops a two sector general equilibrium
model of an open economy along the lines of Harberger (1962) , but where the rates of return on investment in each sector are fixed by the no-arbitrage conditions (1) to (4), and where the total capital stock employed is not fixed. As in the standard Harberger model, the impact of a change in tax in one sector on investment in each sector depends on a number of factors, including the elasticity of demand for each good, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in each sector, and the capital intensity of each sector. Specifically, the relationship between dr D (determined by (6)) and dK D and dK I is (see the Appendix for details):
where, the hat again denotes the proportional change, eg.
and that is, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in each sector is greater in absolute terms than the elasticity of demand in the same sector. Using (9),
where b>0 under the same conditions as those for which K D and K I move in opposite directions.
Using these conditions from the two sector general equilibrium model permits further analysis of the impact of the tax change on indirect utility, given in (8). Specifically, it is possible to show that dU=0 requires: More generally, however, it is likely that b ¹ 0, implying that the optimal value of t D depends on t I .
For b ¹ 0, the impact of a change in t I on the optimal value of t D may be positive or negative. This is because b depends on t I both directly and indirectly through K I . At low levels of taxation, a rise in t I is likely to imply a rise in the optimal value of t D . A positive t I has the effect of discouraging inbound direct investment. This can be offset by raising the tax on domestic investment (financed by an alternative form of inbound investment). However, as t I continues to increase, and hence K I to fall, the optimal value of t D is likely to fall. At this point, the negative effects of higher tax rates on both forms of inbound investment tend to dominate, and a lower tax rate is needed on domestic direct investment in order to maintain sufficient economic activity in the economy.
Tax rate on inbound direct investment, t I
The condition for the optimal tax rate on inbound direct investment, t I , is identical to that for domestic direct investment, t D . To see this, consider again the no arbitrage conditions with a small change in t I . Again from Proposition 1, dR D =0, implying that there is no change to portfolio flows of resident investors. Also, from (1), holding other tax rates fixed, then there is also no change the required pre-corporation tax rates of return on domestic and outbound investment:
Differentiating (2) implies:
that is, an increase in t I implies an increase in the pre-tax rate of return, r I , in order to leave R N unchanged. In turn, this implies a reduction in inbound direct investment, K I .
As in the previous case market conditions for outbound investment are not affected, implying that dK F = 0. However, the reduction in inbound direct investment affects the return to domestic direct investment along the lines discussed above. Specifically, the equivalent condition to (9) is:
Sufficient conditions for dK D /dK I < 0 are again those given in (13). Totally differentiating (5) again yields (7), and substituting into the expression for dU and using the definition of b in (14), the first order condition for dU=0 is again (15).
Since (15) is the condition for the optimal choice of both t D and t I (conditional on other tax rates fixed) these two tax rates have no unique optimal level. Although one possible set of optimising values is the classical result of not taxing investment financed by inbound flows -(1-m I )(1-X D )=1 (ie. T=0) and t I =0 -this is by no means the 12 Given a non-zero value of t I .
only set of optimal values. Instead there is a continuum of pairs of values consistent with maximising welfare.
Tax rate on outbound direct investment, t F
Now consider the tax rate on outbound direct investment, t F . Once again, from proposition 1, R D is unaffected. Given dR D =0, conditions (1) and (2) imply in turn that the pre-tax rates of return on domestic and inbound direct investment, r D and r I , are also unaffected.
Together, these results imply that a small increase in t F would reduce outbound direct investment, K F , up to the point where the resulting increase its pre-tax rate of return, r F , exactly offsets the higher tax rate, leaving R D unchanged. This can be seen by totally differentiating (1):
The lower outbound direct investment is matched by a reduction in inbound portfolio investment, W I , so that dK F = dW I . All other economic activity is unaffected, implying that dU=adY and hence dY = 0 Þ dU = 0. Totally differentiating (5), using (18) and dK F = dW I and rearranging, implies:
In this case, the impact on indirect utility consists only on the impact on outbound investment. The first term in (19) is the effect of the change in the pre-tax rate of return, and the second is the effect of the change in the level of outbound direct investment.
Now define h as the absolute value of the elasticity of outbound direct investment, K F , with respect to its pre-tax rate of return, r F :
Using the no arbitrage conditions, this implies that a sufficient condition for dU=0 is:
The left hand side of condition (21) reflects the tax levied on conduit investmentoutbound direct investment financed by inbound portfolio investment. As h®¥ -where the government has no market power -then the combined tax rate on conduit investment should be zero. However, if 1<h<¥, then the government can increase the total social return to outbound direct investment by restricting its level. While individual domestic companies take the pre-tax rate of return on outbound direct investment as given, the government may exploit the fact that the sector as a whole has market power, reflected in a diminishing return to outbound direct investment. Total income can be increased by taxing this conduit investment, thereby reducing the size of outbound direct investment and driving up r F . This type of result is of course, essentially the optimum tariff argument, familiar from trade theory.
Tax rate on domestic portfolio investment, m D
Once again, Proposition 1 implies that dR D =0. Since the tax rate on inward portfolio investment is unchanged, the post-corporation tax rate of return earned by domestic companies is also unchanged. Given this, (3) implies that the lower post-tax rate of return to domestic portfolio investment resulting from a rise in m D , induces domestic investors to switch funds into outbound portfolio investment, in turn increasing its costs. Totally differentiating (3) yields:
indicating that the switch continues until the higher costs associated with outbound investment exactly offset the higher tax rate. The reduction in funds provided to domestic companies by domestic investors is in turn exactly matched by an increase in inbound portfolio investment, leaving R D unchanged. Hence dW F = dW I = -dW D . In turn, this implies that there is no effect on the total supply of funds to domestic companies, or on the flow on inbound direct investment.
Since direct investment is unaffected, so are output prices, and utility is maximised by maximising national income. Totally differentiating (5), given these conditions, implies
Using (3), dY/dm D =0 if:
This is equivalent to the 'seesaw' result of Slemrod et al (1997) 
Tax rate on outbound portfolio investment, m F
The condition for the optimal tax rate on outbound portfolio investment is identical to (24), and the reasoning is exactly the same. In this case, a higher m F would encourage a switch towards domestic investment, displacing inbound portfolio investment, until the costs of outbound investment are reduced. Differentiating (3) yields:
Again, dW F = dW I = -dW D and there is no effect on direct investment. Totally differentiating (5) in these conditions, with dY=0ÞdU=0, the resulting first-order condition for the optimal value of m F is identical to (24). 
Summary and interpretation
The six potential first order conditions corresponding to the six tax instruments therefore collapse to just three independent relationships, given in (15), (21) and (24):
To interpret these further, consider first the cases in which h®¥ and b=0, implying respectively that the government has no market power with respect to outbound direct investment, and that marginal changes in domestic direct investment have no impact on inbound direct investment. In this case, it is straightforward to show that the optimal value of t I is zero. In addition, the three conditions above imply:
The first three elements of (26) reflect the tax rates on the three investment opportunities implicitly available to resident individuals: outbound portfolio investment, domestic portfolio investment financing domestic direct investment and domestic portfolio investment financing outbound direct investment. Given these conditions, the optimal values of tax rates on these three are equal to each other: just as in the "classical" model, tax rates on capital exports should equal those on domestic investment. The last element of (26) is a restatement of the 'seesaw' result of Slemrod et al (1997) applied to portfolio investment.
There are an infinite number of possible combinations of tax rates which satisfy (26).
However, for any positive tax rate on domestic and outbound direct investment, t D and t F , inbound portfolio investment must be subsidised, m I <0. If tax rates are constrained to be non-negative, then optimal tax rates on these flows are zero. Combined with a zero tax on inbound direct investment, this implies that no tax should be levied on any corporate income. While this is consistent with a residence base tax, since m D = m F can be positive, it implies that the remaining tax must be levied at the level of the individual investor, rather than the corporation.
Beyond the case in which h®0 and b=0, though,. there are clearly a still wider array of optimal tax rates. In particular, there are three different relationships.
First, from (15), taxes on domestic direct investment offset taxes on inbound direct investment. If the two forms of investment are substitutes -in the sense that they move in different directions following a change in tax on one of them -then a higher (lower) tax on domestic investment requires a higher (lower) tax on inbound investment, and vice versa. There is no requirement for either tax to be zero. The relationship between the two optimal tax rates hinges on the general equilibrium conditions in the domestic economy. For example, higher inbound direct investment would drive up the demand for labour raising the equilibrium wage rate, ceteris paribus reducing the profitability of domestic investment. Other effects would depend on the demand conditions for each type of output.
Second, from (21), the tax rate on outbound direct investment should be zero, except in cases where the country has some market power in the rest of the world (ie. h is finite). This contrasts strongly with the "classical" result that the tax rate on outbound direct investment should be the same as the tax rate on domestic direct investment.
The reason for this result is that in this model these two forms of investment are not substitutes, as they are in the "classical" framework, which has a fixed supply of saving. Instead, given the availability of unlimited inward portfolio investment at a fixed rate of return, then domestic companies can finance both forms of investment independently of each other. Conditions affecting one form of investment do not affect the other form of investment.
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Third, from (24), there should be a "seesaw" relationship for the reasons identified by Slemrod et al (1997) , although this should apply only to tax rates on portfolio investment.
Conclusions
This paper has explored the implications for optimal international tax policy of there This model allows a rich set of optimal tax rates, for example:
1. The optimal combined tax rate on domestic direct investment funded by inbound portfolio investment is determined jointly with the optimal tax rate on inbound direct investment.
2. The optimal tax rate on outbound direct investment (funded by inbound portfolio investment) depends on whether the country as a whole has any market power in foreign markets. If it does not, this combined tax rate should be zero; otherwise it may be positive.
3. Apart from the optimal tax rate on outbound direct investment, a pure residencebased tax is consistent with the optimal conditions in this paper. However, ruling out negative tax rates implies that only domestic and outbound portfolio investment should be taxed.
4. Tax rates on portfolio flows should follow the 'seesaw' principle outlined by Slemrod et al (1997) . For a given domestic tax rate, a higher tax rate on inbound portfolio investment implies a lower optimal tax rate on outbound portfolio investment.
Any model represents, of course, a simplification of the real world. There are at least three areas where more detailed modelling might be beneficial: introducing imperfect competition to reflect the behaviour of multinationals; the costs of international portfolio investment, perhaps incorporating risk, to provide a more realistic setting which allows for simultaneous inbound and outbound portfolio investment; and allowing resident subsidiaries of non-resident multinationals to raise finance domestically.
APPENDIX. Two sector open economy model
Consider an economy split into two sectors, the domestic sector, D, and the "inbound" sector, I. In the former, capital is owned by resident firms; in the latter it is owned by non-resident firms. We proceed by setting out the relevant relationships in the economy. Assume that each sector is perfectly competitive and produces output Q D and Q I using capital, K D and K I respectively, and labour, L D and L I respectively, under conditions of constant returns to scale. The fixed stock of labour,
, is fully mobile between sectors. The derivation of the model loosely follows Myles (1995) and the original model of Harberger (1962) .
where e i is the own compensated elasticity of demand. 14 The hat denotes the proportional change eg.
Production
Each production function is assumed to be homogeneous of degree 1: 
